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INTRODUCTION 
Like many commercial law professors, I have long been fascinated 
with the workings of the Uniform Commercial Code's section 2-207, 
the "battle of the forms" provision. There are two features of that sec­
tion, one internal and one external, that make it such an intriguing 
statute to ponder. The internal source of fascination with section 2-
207 is that it provides a classic model for teaching students about the 
intricacies of statutory construction. There is probably no other provi­
sion within U.C.C. Article 2 that provides more confusion to law stu­
dents and more challenge to the instructor than does section 2-207. 
There is a little bit of everything in there: subsections that must be 
reconciled, Official Comments that must be reckoned with, and even 
an apparent drafter's error or two that turns what would already be a 
difficult statute into a nearly incomprehensible one.1 
As good a device as section 2-207 is for introducing students to dif­
ficult statutory construction problems, I suspect that the more in­
triguing aspect of the provision for law professors is the .strange kind 
of contract that the section sanctions. In a sense, the classic battle-of­
the-forms sale turns contract law on its head. This is a deal in which 
the two parties recklessly, if not knowingly, consummate a sale of 
goods without having settled on all of the terms. And while one could 
argue that every contract is incomplete at some level, what distin­
guishes the battle of the forms case is that these contracts are most of­
ten incomplete at very fundamental levels. Left unsettled are issues 
like warranties, remedies, and other matters that no one could pretend 
were beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of formation. 
A second distinction between the battle-of-the-forms situation and the 
typical incomplete contract is that with the battle of the forms, each 
side has specifically proposed something for the open term so that we 
know exactly what both parties wanted for that term. 
During the last few years, interest in section 2-207 has been espe­
cially strong in light of the Article 2 revision efforts that are finally 
1. The two apparent drafting errors are found in subsections (1) and (2) of section 2-207. 
In section 2-207(1), the statute refers to a "written confirmation . • .  [that] operates as an ac­
ceptance." U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1999). Since a confirmation implies the existence of the con­
tract that is being confirmed, it seems odd that the confirmation could serve as the accep­
tance. By definition, if there is a confirmation of a pre-existing contract, then there must 
have already been an offer and an acceptance. In section 2-207(2), we are told what to do 
with "additional terms" in an acceptance form. Id. at § 2-207(2). But Official Comment 
Three to section 2-207 begins by stating: "Whether or not additional or different terms will 
become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2)." Id. at§ 2-207 
cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
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coming to a head.2 Given nearly 40 years of experience with the cur­
rent battle-of-the-forms provision, the Article 2 revision committee is 
now in a position to try to fix whatever is broken with that section and 
perhaps to usher in the new millennium with a kinder, gentler section 
2-207. What has been largely missing, however, in the many writings 
about how to improve section 2-207 is an attempt to study how it actu­
ally operates in practice. Up until recently, there has been precious 
little empirical work done in the sales law area generally,3 but par­
ticularly so in the realm of the battle of the forms.4 Given that literally 
dozens of articles have been written about section 2-207,5 it is striking 
that virtually none of them endeavors to investigate, at even a cursory 
level, how the provision plays out in the field.6 
2. In May of 1999, the American Law Institute ("ALI") passed the revised version of 
U.C.C. Article 2 that had been produced by a drafting committee headed by Reporters 
Richard Speidel and Linda Rusch. In July of 1999, however, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") decided to postpone voting on the 
draft approved by ALI for fear that not all states would choose to adopt it. Professors 
Speidel and Rusch both resigned their positions as a result of NCCUSL's decision to delay. 
See emails from Christopher Hoving to UCCLAW-L listserv (July 26 and 27, 1999) (on file 
with author). A newly constituted drafting committee chaired by Professor William 
Henning has produced a new draft revision of Article 2 that was released in November of 
1999. 
3. For some notable exceptions, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: 
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); 
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 {1992); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Re­
lations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 {1963); Russell J, Weintraub, 
A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1; James J, White, Contract Law 
in Modern Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 
WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1982). 
4. But see Electronic Messaging Servs. Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic 
Data Interchange - A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645 
{1990); Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use 
of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 45 {1975). 
5. A nonexhaustive sampling of the articles that have appeared during the last five years 
includes: Alex Devience, Jr., The Renewed Search for the "Bargain in Fact" Under the UCC 
Section 2-207: Battle of the Forms, Part II?, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 349 {1997); Victor P. Gold­
berg, The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 
155 {1997); Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 {1997); Alexander M. Meikle­
john, Castles in the Air: Blanket Assent and the Revision of Article 2, 51 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 599 {1994); Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Redrafting U.C.C. Section 2-207: An 
Economic Prescription for the Battle of the Forms, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 403 {1996); Mark E. 
Roszkowski & John D. Wladis, Revised U.C.C. Section 2-207: Analysis and Recommenda­
tions, 49 Bus. LAW. 1065 {1994); Nicholas R. Weiskopf, The Last Hurdle in the Ongoing Re­
vision of Section 2-207 of the UCC: Defining What Constitutes Assent to Varying Terms, 30 
UCC LJ. 423 {1998); Phillip A White, A Few Comments About the Proposed Revisions to 
UCC Section 2-207: The Battle of the Forms Taken to the Limit of Reason, 103 COM. L.J. 471 
{1998). 
6. The article by Professor Meiklejohn is something of an exception to this trend. While 
Meiklejohn does not attempt to conduct his own empirical study, he does focus on what little 
empirical evidence there is on the issue. Given the absence of any empirical evidence about 
the existence of a "blanket assent" practice, he concludes that the drafters of revised Article 
2 should simply get rid of section 2-207 altogether and let U.C.C. § 2-204 handle the issue of 
nonmatching terms in a battle of the forms. See Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 606-07. 
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The purpose of this Article is to report on a modest study that I 
undertook of how the battle-of-the-forms provision affects commercial 
behavior. In conducting these twenty-five recorded telephone inter­
views with representatives of companies that buy and sell goods, my 
purposes were threefold: first, to test the validity of several factual as­
sumptions that underlie most of the scholarship in this area; second, to 
try to get a better sense of what reforms, if any, ought to be made to 
section 2-207; and third, to determine what effects, if any, the increas­
ing use of technology in sales contract formation has had on the battle 
of the forms. 
My series of interviews suggested a number of results that were 
surprising, at least to someone like myself whose knowledge of section 
2-207 has been mainly schooled by the conventional wisdom contained 
in most law review articles on this subject. First, and perhaps most 
fundamentally, the classic battle-of-the-forms situation7 seems to be, 
for a variety of reasons, much less prevalent than one would guess 
from reading most academic literature in this area. Second, without 
any legal incentives to do so, some companies have shifted to drafting 
less one-sided forms, at least as to issues that are not seen as critical to 
their side's interests. Third, even where a battle of the forms occurs, a 
number of parties will actually read the terms on the other side's 
forms in certain fairly well-defined instances. Finally, technological 
advances in contract formation appear to be having less impact in re­
ducing the significance of section 2-207 than are certain market shifts 
that have led to the formation of various mega-retailers who can 
pretty much set the rules for any of their purchase orders. 
In terms of reform ideas, these interviews left me with the sense 
that probably all that is needed is a fairly modest simplification of sec­
tion 2-207 along the lines of what the Article 2 revision process seems 
likely to yield anyway at this point.8 I did, however, solicit reactions 
from many of my subjects regarding two of the more creative and 
radical section 2-207 reform ideas that were proposed by academics.9 
While both of those proposals found some support among the inter­
viewees, the apparent consensus of those in the trenches is for a sec-
7. When I refer to "the battle-of-the-forms situation" or "engaging in the battle of 
forms," I don't mean to imply the existence of a dispute, but merely that forms were ex­
changed that had nonmatching terms. 
8. In the November 1999 "Reporter's Interim Draft for Co=ent" of revised Article 2, 
the proposed section 2-207 is a simpler, more streamlined version of what we currently have. 
For a fuller description of the revised version of section 2-207, see infra Part V. Copies of 
the "Reporter's Interim Draft" may be obtained from this author, or from The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 E. Ontario Street, Suite 1300, 
Chicago, Illinois 60611. 
9. These two proposals are described in full in Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, 
Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 
1217 (1982), and Goldberg, supra note 5. The proposals are described briefly in Part V, in­
fra. 
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tion 2-207 with fewer loopholes and a more immediate reliance on the 
U.C.C. gap-fillers to resolve any issues for which the two sides' forms 
have conflicting terms. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I considers the state of cur­
rent section 2-207 law that governs the battle-of-the-forms cases. Part 
II focuses on what commentators perceive to be the key flaws in the 
current section 2-207. Part III describes the methodology I used in 
undertaking these interviews. Part IV reports my findings concerning 
four central factual assumptions that have been made in most scholar­
ship about the battle of the forms. Part V reports the reactions of in­
terview subjects to a few specific reform proposals for section 2-207. 
Part VI explores the effects that technology and certain nontechnol­
ogy factors are likely to have on the future of the battle of the forms. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
If you think of the battle of the forms as a game, it is much more 
analogous to tic-tac-toe than it is to chess. Just like in the game tic­
tac-toe, it is difficult for either side to win the battle of the forms with 
clever drafting, at least if we define "winning" as making the other 
side be held to your nondickered terms. By the same token, it is easy 
with good drafting never to lose the battle of the forms, at least if 
"losing" equals letting your side get stuck with the other party's 
boilerplate terms. 
In order to appreciate how section 2-207 currently operates, one 
must first understand both the business situation that it was designed 
to address and the common law approach to the problem that section 
2-207 was intended to replace. Suppose that a buyer and a seller sit 
down and negotiate a contract for the sale of a sophisticated machine. 
If the two parties put all of the terms of their contract in writing and 
both sign a single document embodying those terms, section 2-207 will 
have nothing to say about the situation. There would be no issue in 
that case about whether and when the contract was formed - since 
both sides signed a written contract - and there would be no question 
about terms, since the contract covers all of the key terms (or at least 
those that the parties could think of in advance of the sale). 
Now suppose instead that these same two parties involved in the 
sale of a machine did not sit down and sign a negotiated contract with 
terms and conditions. Instead the buyer simply sent a purchase order 
to the seller that contained the model, price, and the needed delivery 
date of the machine on the front, with nonimmediate terms such as 
warranties and remedies in boilerplate on the back. The seller, in 
tum, responded to the buyer's purchase order with an acknowledg­
ment form that reiterated the buyer's performance terms on the front 
but contained completely different nonimmediate terms in boilerplate 
on the back. Neither party read the back of the other party's form, 
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though both parties did confirm the specifics of the front. The seller 
then shipped the goods and the buyer paid for them. Later the ma­
chine malfunctioned and caused significant damage to the buyer's 
business, damages that were indeed well beyond what the machine 
cost the buyer. 
In this latter case, we are faced with questions both about forma­
tion - whether and when - and about whose nonimmediate terms 
will control. On the formation question, almost anyone would agree 
that there was a valid contract at some point. After all, the buyer and 
seller acted as if there were a contract by, at a minimum, shipping and 
paying for the machine, respectively. The "when" of formation is 
trickier, though: should formation be found to have occurred at the 
time the seller sent its acknowledgment form to the buyer, or not until 
each party performed some act that indicated its belief that there was 
a sales contract? 
The "terms" question is messier still. Buyer's and seller's forms 
simply do not agree on the issue of warranties and remedies; there was 
clearly no "meeting of the minds" there. Should we go with buyer's 
terms, since buyer made the offer and offerors are said to be the mas­
ters of their own offers? Should we go with seller's terms, since seller 
sent the second form of the two forms involved and thus perhaps be­
lieved that buyer was impliedly assenting to the changes that were 
contained in seller's form? Or should we enforce neither the buyer's 
nor the seller's terms, but instead some terms gleaned from a third­
party source? 
The dilemma that the law must face with this classic battle-of-the­
forms scenario, as Professors Douglas Baird and Robert Weisberg 
have pointed out, is that on the one hand, there is simply no way that 
these questions can be answered with reference to the two parties' 
"bargain in fact" - they simply did not have one as to these nonim­
mediate terms.10 On the other hand, the law has to pick something on 
the issue of which warranties and which remedies will govern: either 
the buyer's terms, the seller's, or someone else's. The law just cannot 
punt on this one. 
Prior to the enactment of the U.C.C., the common law followed 
what became known as the "mirror image" and "last shot" doctrines, 
the former governing formation and the latter dictating terms.11 What 
the mirror-image rule says is that when an offer is made, a purported 
acceptance whose terms are not the "mirror image" of the offer will 
not count as an acceptance but instead will be treated as a counter­
offer. Thus, in the above example, the seller's acknowledgment form 
would not serve as an acceptance to the buyer's offer to purchase the 
10. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 1219-20. 
11. See DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 48 (1998). 
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machine since the nonimmediate terms on the two forms were not the 
mirror images of each other. The seller's acknowledgment form 
would serve instead as a counteroffer, and the buyer's act of paying for 
the goods would count as an acceptance of the seller's counteroffer. 
This is where the "last shot" doctrine comes into play. Because a 
purported acceptance such as the seller's is treated as a counteroffer 
that is then accepted by the buyer's performance, the seller's terms 
will govern by virtue of its having fired the "last shot." Thus, under 
the common law approach, the contract would be formed upon the 
buyer's payment, and the seller would get the benefit of its presuma­
bly more limited warranties and remedies when the machine malfunc­
tioned in the buyer's hands. 
The common law approach clearly had its critics. A typical com­
plaint about the mirror-image rule, for example, is that it would allow 
a party to renege on what was likely intended to be a binding deal, as 
long as the party did so prior to any performance on its part.12 As Pro­
fessors Baird and Weisberg point out, this criticism was probably 
overplayed:13 first, this wasn't likely to be a significant risk in practice, 
since most of the problems with exchange-of-forms deals came after 
the goods had been delivered and something went wrong with the 
goods; and second, in the rare case of a party seeking to renege on a 
forms contract prior to its performance, courts could and arguably did 
stretch the mirror-image doctrine to find that there was indeed agree­
ment between the forms if they sensed an opportunistic breacher. 
A separate source of complaint about the common law approach 
was the arbitrariness and the all-or-nothing nature of the last-shot doc­
trine.14 Why, after all, should one party's boilerplate terms control in 
their entirety by the relative happenstance of that party's having sent 
the last form in the exchange? Given that there was never a bargain­
in-fact on those terms in the first place, it seemed unfair to these critics 
to adopt a winner-take-all approach rather than to require some kind 
of compromise. 
The enactment of section 2-207 of the U.C.C. responded to both of 
these concerns. On the formation issue, section 2-207(1) makes it 
clear that the mere existence of additional or different terms in a 
writing that otherwise purports to be an acceptance will not prevent 
that writing from operating as an acceptance.15 Thus, subsection (1) of 
section 2-207 marked the end to the common law's mirror-image rule. 
12 See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 1223 ("Commentators assume that the 
mirror-image rule cannot resolve the problem of the welsher satisfactorily."). 
13. See id. at 1233-37. 
14. See id. at 1232 (referring to the rule's "principal vice: arbitrary and fonnalistic deci­
sions"). 
15. The precise text of section 2-207(1) is as follows: "A definite and seasonable expres­
sion of acceptance or a written confinnation which is sent within a reasonable time operates 
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Even under section 2-207(1), however, not every purported accep­
tance with nonmatching terms will count as a valid acceptance. First, 
the acceptance must still qualify as a "definite and seasonable expres­
sion of acceptance" according to the language of the statute. Thus, for 
example, the acceptance still must be sent within a reasonable time 
following the offer. Further, there must be some point at which the 
terms in the purported acceptance so diverge from the terms of the of­
fer that you do not really have an acceptance at all.16 If the buyer of­
fers to buy apples and the seller accepts the buyer's offer for the seller 
to sell oranges, the seller's "acceptance" should not create a contract. 
An acceptance to sell oranges is not a "definite and seasonable expres­
sion of acceptance" to the buyer's offer to buy apples. 
The second way in which a purported acceptance with nonmatch­
ing terms will not operate as an acceptance is if the offeree uses the 
magic language of section 2-207(1) and makes it clear that its accep­
tance of the offer "is expressly made conditional on [the offeror's] as­
sent to the additional or different terms [contained in the accep­
tance]." When that language or something very close to it is used, 
then there is no contract formation until the offeror gives its specific 
assent to the offeree's additional or different terms. Performance 
alone by the offeror should not count as such assent to the new terms, 
or else we are simply back to the last-shot doctrine. 
Whereas section 2-207(1) more or less reverses the mirror-image 
rule of the common law, section 2-207(2) changes the last-shot doc­
trine. If a contract is formed by the exchange of writings under section 
2-207(1), then section 2-207(2) tells us what the contract's terms are. 
Between merchants, any additional terms in the acceptance document 
will become part of the contract unless those terms materially alter the 
offer, or unless the offeror has specifically indicated either in its offer 
or after receiving the acceptance that the offer is limited to its terms. 
When the acceptance includes different rather than additional terms 
and the contract is between merchants, most courts follow the knock­
out rule, which ignores the conflicting terms and looks instead to the 
U.C.C. gap-fillers for those terms.17 
Section 2-207(3), the last subsection of section 2-207, covers the 
case in which the parties exchange forms but the forms themselves do 
not make a contract, either because the terms are too divergent or be-
as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or 
agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or 
different terms." U.C.C. § 2-207 ( 1). · 
16. In order for the purported acceptance to be valid as such, Professors White and 
Summers would require at a minimum that the acceptance is in agreement with the offer "as 
to price, quality, quantity, [and] delivery terms." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§§ 1-3, at 33 {5th ed. 2000). 
17. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 ( 10th Cir. 1984) ( applying 
the "knockout rule"). 
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cause the acceptance was expressly made conditional on the offeror's 
assent to the different or additional terms and no assent was forth­
coming. In that case, if the two sides proceed to perform anyway, then 
the conduct of the two parties serves to establish the existence of the 
contract. The terms that govern such a conduct-formed contract are 
"those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with 
[the U.C.C. gap-fillers]."18 
When section 2-207 was first enacted nearly forty years ago, any 
commercial lawyer who stepped back for a minute and assessed the 
practical impact of the new section vis-a-vis the common law would 
quickly come to a number of conclusions. First, whether you repre­
sent the offeror or the offeree, you can (and arguably should) include 
magic language in your form that will greatly limit the likelihood that 
you will get stuck with the other side's boilerplate terms. If you are 
the offeror, you can specifically limit the terms of your offer to the 
terms that are included therein, and while you are at it, you can object 
in advance to any additional or different terms that the offeree might 
include in its purported acceptance of your offer. If you are the of­
feree, you can mimic the language of section 2-207(1) and expressly 
condition your acceptance on the offeror's assent to any additional or 
different terms that you have included in your acceptance. 
By using the magic language, you put yourself in a position where 
the worst place you can end up regarding the boilerplate terms, should 
you choose to perform, is with the U.C.C. gap-fillers. But that brings 
you to your second conclusion: this whole new approach, compared to 
the common law, raises the stakes on the U.C.C. gap-fillers, so you 
had better know what they are in order to determine whether you are 
truly comfortable with them. If you represent buyers, this is probably 
not a bad place to be since the U.C.C. gap-fillers include fairly broad 
warranty and remedy provisions, including the implied warranty of 
merchantability19 and generous consequential damages.20 
The third practical conclusion that a thoughtful commercial lawyer 
would reach about the U.C.C.'s approach to the battle of the forms is 
that there is simply no way for either side to ensure victory in this 
fight, at least if victory is defined as getting the other side to be bound 
by your boilerplate terms rather than theirs. You can, of course, try to 
ensure victory by refusing to perform your side of the contract until 
the other side signs on to the terms in your form. At that point, 
though, you would end up with a real negotiated contract and it would 
no longer be a true battle of the forms. 
18. u.c.c. § 2-207(3). 
19. See id. a!§ 2-314. 
20. See id. at§ 2-715(2). 
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If the third conclusion is the bad news - that there is no sure rec­
ipe for success in this battle - then the fourth conclusion is the good 
news: neither side is ultimately forced to play by the other side's 
terms in this battle. In other words, both sides have the ability to opt 
out of the rules of section 2-207 completely, either by insisting on a 
fully negotiated contract signed by both sides, or by seller refusing to 
ship the goods or by buyer refusing to pay for the goods. The bad 
news about this good news, though, is that not playing the game has its 
own costs. Perhaps this is a sale that you really want to make, albeit 
not on the buyer's terms. Or perhaps you feel that it would be too ex­
pensive, given the fairly small size of the deal or the limited risk in­
volved, to sit down and negotiate about nonimmediate terms that are 
unlikely to matter in the end anyway. 
The last conclusion that our astute commercial lawyer would draw 
after studying section 2-207 is that this is a section that leaves a lot of 
uncertainty about a lot of things - things like whether an acceptance 
really does count as "definite and seasonable," whether an additional 
term in an acceptance is a "material alteration" of the offer's terms, or 
what happens if the U.C.C. does not have a specific gap-filler for the 
issue on which the terms conflict. Some commentators have assailed 
the uncertainty of the current section 2-207 as one of its most unattrac­
tive features.21 
Most of the action in the reported cases concerning section 2-207 
arises following performance by the two parties and concerns terms 
rather than contract formation.22 When there is a fight about forma­
tion in a reported case, it is typically only a precursor to a dispute over 
terms. That is because the questions of when a contract was formed 
and what are its terms are inextricably linked in section 2-207. If a 
contract was formed by the exchange of writings under section 2-
207 (1 ), then the terms are determined under section 2-207(2), which 
may or may not call into play the U.C.C. gap-fillers. If, on the other 
hand, there was no contract formed by the writings under section 2-
207 (1) but the parties performed anyway, then the terms will neces­
sarily be determined under section 2-207(3), which will always look to 
the U.C.C. gap-fillers except when the two forms already agree on the 
term in question. 
II. REFORMING SECTION 2-207 
Of the many dozens of articles that have been written about the 
battle-of-the-forms statute, the one thing that just about all of the 
authors agree with is that section 2-207 could be improved. Beyond 
21. See, e.g., Ostas & Darr, supra note 5, at 412-13. 
22 See, e.g. , Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997). See gen­
erally WlilTE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 29-48. 
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that point of agreement, commentators have offered a variety of vi­
sions as to what the ideal battle-of-the-forms provision would look 
like. Before delving into some of the specific proposals that have been 
put forth, it would probably be worthwhile to consider the various 
ways in which commercial law scholars believe that the current section 
2-207 is broken. It seems to me that there are at least three common 
themes that run through the laments about the state of section 2-207. 
1. The Current Section 2-207 Is Too Technical, Arbitrary, and 
Uncertain in Its Outcomes 
This complaint combines a number of related themes concerning 
the general user unfriendliness of the current battle-of-the-forms stat­
ute. One author in this area, Professor John Murray, observes that the 
outcome of battle-of-the-forms contests should not come down to such 
niceties as which form is the offer and which is the acceptance, par­
ticularly since in his experience the parties involved never think of 
their forms as "offers" and "acceptances" in any event.23 Another pair 
of commentators opine that the last-shot doctrine of the common law 
has essentially been replaced by an equally technical and arbitrary 
"first-shot" doctrine under section 2-207.24 Along the same lines, Pro­
fessor Sandy Meiklejohn points out that one fundamental flaw in the 
existing section 2-207 is that it creates at least the possibility that one 
party might get stuck with the other side's boilerplate terms despite 
any actual or implied consent by the party that would be bound by the 
other side's form.25 
Beyond the arbitrary outcomes suggested above, there is the sepa­
rate but related matter of uncertainty of outcome. If neither side 
really knows how its respective rights are allocated in a battle of the 
forms, that arguably increases transactions costs both at the front end 
and at the back end in the event of litigation. Professors Daniel Ostas 
and Frank Darr note how the current section 2-207's uncertainty of 
outcome increases transaction costs at both stages: at the front end, 
the uncertainty of outcome gives parties a perverse incentive to read 
fine print on the other side's form that they might otherwise be able to 
ignore if there were greater certainty about the battle-of-the-forms 
outcome;26 on the back end, the uncertainty of how courts will come 
out on a battle-of-the-forms case increases costs because it encourages 
parties to litigate rather than to settle.27 
23. John E. Murray, Jr., A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 6 J.L. & COM. 337, 351 (1986). 
24. See Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 5, at 1071. 
25. See Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 606-07. 
26. See Ostas & Darr, supra note 5, at 412-13. 
27. See id. at 414. 
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2. The Default Terms to Which Section 2-207 Directs the Parties Are 
Too Favorable to the Buyer and May Not Be Terms That Either 
Side Would Have Chosen in an Arms-Length Bargain 
This point is as much a complaint about the nature of the U.C.C. 
gap-fillers in general as it is about section 2-207 in particular. Never­
theless, the machinery of section 2-207 is clearly designed to send bat­
tle-of-the-forms stalemates to "any supplementary terms incorporated 
under any other provisions of this Act."28 Critics have at least two 
problems with that outcome. The first is that the U.C.C. gap-fillers 
give the purchaser an unfair advantage. The second is that the gap­
fillers, while nice in the abstract, really do not work particularly well 
for any given deal. 
Fairly early in the Article 2 revision process, a practicing lawyer 
wrote to members of the drafting committee that if they were going to 
clear up the uncertainties in the current section 2-207 and thereby 
push more cases directly to the gap-fillers, then they really ought to fix 
the gap-fillers so that they did not favor the buyer so much.29 This 
lawyer added that it was no answer to his criticism to say that the 
seller could always refuse to sell if it truly required its own terms as to 
things like warranties and remedies. The problem with that approach, 
the lawyer said, is that it puts the burden on the seller to spend its 
money to try to negotiate every deal away from what would end up 
being the default terms.30 
An even more fundamental concern with the default mechanism of 
the current battle of the forms is not that it favors buyers, but rather 
that it yields terms that may be in neither party's interest. Professors 
Baird and Weisberg observe that with certain quality issues such as 
warranties, the buyer rather than the seller may be the cheaper risk­
avoider.31 If that is the case, then it is inefficient for the seller to pro­
vide a broad warranty (at a higher cost to buyer) instead of simply 
selling the product more cheaply with no warranty.32 Yet under the 
current battle-of-the-forms regime, the U.C.C.'s gap-filler on warranty 
provides broad implied warranties. This in turn encourages wasteful 
negotiations between buyer and seller that are conducted solely to 
bargain around an inefficient gap-filler.33 
Professor Victor Goldberg provides another example of what he 
believes to be a U.C.C. gap-filler that neither party would choose if 
28. u.c.c. § 2-207(3). 
29. See Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 5, at 1069. 
30. See id. 
31. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 1250-51. 
32 See id. 
33. See id. 
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the parties had negotiated about it: the availability of consequential 
damages.34 Professor Stewart Macaulay's empirical work lends some 
support to this notion in that he found that industrial sellers did not 
typically offer buyers consequential damages, at least not voluntarily.35 
My own interviews also suggest a sense in both buyers and sellers that 
unlimited consequential damages for a product that itself does not cost 
the buyer that much is, in the absence of some clear fault on the 
seller's part, somehow inappropriate.36 Indeed, "consequential dam­
ages" was singled out as probably the single "boilerplate term" that 
the companies in my study are the most likely to negotiate about. 
3. The Current Section 2-207 Encourages Parties to Draft 
Completely One-Sided Forms 
One commentator speculates that the reason sellers include one­
sided terms in their forms is that under the existing section 2-207, 
those sellers believe that their terms will (or at least may) ultimately 
control.37 This author suggests that the battle-of-the-forms provision 
ought to be revised to make it clear that in any case where the two 
parties' terms disagree, the court will simply provide the U.C.C. gap­
fillers.38 Similarly, Professor Goldberg writes that very few of the sec­
tion 2-207 reform efforts and commentary have adequately focused on 
how to shift the incentives of the parties to take into account the inter­
ests of the other side when drafting their forms.39 One notable excep­
tion to this oversight is the proposal by Professors Baird and Weis­
berg; Professor Goldberg has different criticisms of that proposal.40 
34. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 157. 
35. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract 
Teaching: Past, Present, and Future, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 805, 818. 
36. See, e.g., Interview No. 4 (transcript at 4-5) (on file with author) (suggesting that as a 
buyer, you would typically give up access to consequential damages fairly readily if the seller 
bothered to object about them). 
37. See Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and 
Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207, 33 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 327, 377 
{1983). 
38. See id. 
39. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 156. 
40. See id. at 164 (asking rhetorically that if Baird and Weisberg are correct in their the­
ory that parties will make their forms more balanced from the start as a way to anticipate a 
minority of objectors, then why, under the currently existing knockout rule, haven't a subset 
of sellers policed the one-sidedness of buyers' forms and caused the buyers to make their 
forms more mutually beneficial?). 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Although recently there have been a number of important studies 
that focus on the sales practices of discrete industries,41 on the whole 
there have been very few studies that touch on contract formation is­
sues in general and on U.C.C. section 2-207 in particular. In perhaps 
the most famous interview-based study of the sales system, Professor 
Macaulay conducted a wide-ranging series of interviews with repre­
sentatives from forty-three companies and six law firms nearly forty 
years ago.42 Professor Macaulay's study highlighted the significance of 
noncontractual relations in business and revealed that business people 
are generally not driven much, if at all, by the legal implications of the 
decisions that they make. Perhaps most relevant to contract forma­
tion, Professor Macaulay found that written contracts are very rarely 
enforced in practice and that parties are much more likely to resort to 
nonlegal sanctions to deter would-be breachers.43 
In a study conducted nearly three decades after Professor 
Macaulay's landmark project, Professor Russell Weintraub had corpo­
rate general counsel fill out a written survey concerning the law's ef­
fect on contract practices.44 Professor Weintraub reiterated the con­
clusions of Professor Macaulay's study concerning the primacy of 
business over legal considerations in the day-to-day affairs of com­
merce, but added a key caveat: "[T]he law should not be contrary to 
practices that the community perceives as normal and desirable."45 
Thus, Professor Weintraub discovered in his study that there is a sig­
nificant difference between saying that the law does not control busi­
ness practice and saying that the law has no effect on business practice. 
His key point was that even though business behavior is driven on a 
surface level by business rather than legal considerations, the law nev­
ertheless plays a subtle and important role in the process. 
Somewhat ironically, the most direct study on the battle of the 
forms was conducted in a jurisdiction that still follows the common law 
last-shot doctrine. In a 1975 article, British Professors Hugh Beale 
and Tony Dugdale reported on a series of interviews they conducted 
with representatives from 19 engineering manufacturers in England.46 
The Beale and Dugdale article has been cited in some American law 
41. The two articles by Professor Bernstein, supra note 3, for example, focus on the 
practices of the grain industry and the diamond industry. 
42 See Macaulay, supra note 3, at 55. 
43. See id. at 61-62. 
44. See Weintraub, supra note 3. 
45. Id. at5. 
46. See Beale & Dugdale, supra note 4. England still uses the common law approach to 
the battle of the forms. See Butler Mach. Tool Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (Eng.), [1979] 1 
W.L.R. 401 (C.A. 1977). 
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review articles on battle of the forms as suggesting that, contrary to 
commonly accepted assumptions, at least some parties do read the 
forms that the other side sends and do have some appreciation for 
their legal signifi.cance.47 
Finally, Professor Murray, who has probably written as much and 
has been as influential as any academic in the section 2-207 debate, has 
made reference in some of his work to having spoken with over 5000 
purchasing agents over the course of a decade.48 Although there is not 
a lot of detail in Professor Murray's writings concerning the nature 
and scope of these conversations, he does report that he has never 
found a single purchasing manager who actually read the terms on the 
other side's form and that most purchasing managers could not even 
explain what the terms meant on their own forms much less on the 
other side's.49 
My own study began with me reading every article I could find that 
was published during the last twenty years that focused on section 2-
207 and the battle of the forms. As I read these articles, the two fea­
tures that I was most interested in were: first, what factual assump­
tions the various authors were making concerning the behavior of the 
parties that were involved in the battle of the forms; and second, what 
the authors believed was wrong with section 2-207 as it was currently 
drafted. My aim was to come up with a list of questions that would 
probe the factual assumptions being made by scholars in the area and 
that would also attempt to discern whether the problems in section 2-
207 identified by scholars were also of concern to those in practice. 
Based on this literature review, I came up with an initial series of 
questions to ask subjects. I later refined this series of questions with 
the help of two academics50 who have both done some empirical work 
in commercial law. 
In deciding which companies to approach and which individuals to 
interview at each company, I had the benefit of having conducted a se­
ries of thirteen interviews three years ago in preparation for writing a 
sales casebook.51 Although my previous interviews had touched 
briefly on section 2-207 questions, contract formation was just one of 
47. See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 1254 n.87. 
48. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1317-18 n.47 {1986) [hereinafter Murray, Chaos]; John E. Murray, Jr., 
The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 
CORNELLL. REV. 735, 778 n.207 {1982). 
49. Murray, Chaos, supra note 48, at 1317 n.47. 
50. The two professors who reviewed an earlier draft of the questions were Professors 
James J. White and Ronald J. Mann from the University of Michigan Law School. 
51. The results of those interviews are reported both in KEATING, supra note 11; and in 
Daniel Keating, Measuring Sales Law Against Sales Practice: A Reality Check, 17 J.L. & 
COM. 99 {1997). 
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several issues that I had explored in conversations that were fairly 
broad in their coverage of sales law but not particularly detailed in any 
one area. In my interviews three years ago, I ended up speaking with 
three categories of individuals: business people, in-house corporate 
counsel, and outside counsel that represented companies. What I dis­
covered from that small sample is that the most useful interviews 
seemed to be with in-house counsel, who are perhaps in the best posi­
tion to straddle the line between legal and business concerns. The 
other advantage of interviewing in-house counsel with a battle-of-the­
forms project is that in most companies large enough to have their 
own lawyers, these lawyers almost invariably are the ones who draft 
the forms and who oversee the exchange-of-forms operation. 
While they clearly understand the law, in-house counsel seem also 
to appreciate the inner workings of the company that employs them 
and how, if at all, the law affects those workings. Business people 
clearly bring a unique perspective to bear as well, but their answers of­
ten lack the richness I found in the dual perspectives of the in-house 
counsel. The problem with the outside counsel of a company is that, 
except in unusual cases, they tend not to have their pulse on the way 
things actually work inside the company that they represent. 
I ended up with a sample of both large and small companies, 
though more large than small, with the majority being large manufac­
turers of goods with at least $1 billion in sales each year. These com­
panies buy and sell a variety of different goods, including food prod­
ucts, paint, cars, electronic equipment, medical supplies, and various 
consumer goods. One reason that the sample was biased toward large 
companies is that I suspected these companies would be more likely to 
have thought about battle-of-the-forms problems if for no other rea­
son than the sheer volume of sales that they conduct. St. Louis is the 
most common location for the headquarters of the companies with 
which I spoke, although the majority of the companies are not based 
in St. Louis. Of the companies I interviewed, ten are both a purchaser 
and a vendor in battle-of-the-forms contexts, eleven are exclusively or 
primarily a purchaser, and four are exclusively or primarily a vendor. 
Of the twenty-five companies I interviewed, seventeen were repre­
sented in the interviews by in-house counsel that specialize in con­
tracting practices, six were represented by business people who handle 
sales contracts, and two by outside counsel.52 I actually interviewed 
52. The way in which I identified a person to be interviewed was to find a contact at 
some companies that I knew bought and/or sold goods. A few of these initial contacts were 
acquaintances; others were alumni from the law school where I teach. I felt that it was im­
portant that my initial contact people have some connection to me so that they would be 
willing to take the time to locate for me the person within their company who dealt most 
frequently with exchange-of-form sales contracts. Furthermore, I thought that my having a 
connection to someone in the company would make it more likely that the interview subject 
would ultimately agree to take the time to speak with me. Once I could identify the battle-
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thirty-two people, since at four of the companies I simultaneously in­
terviewed two or more people by speaker phone. The smaller compa­
nies tended to be represented in the interviews by business people, 
since those companies generally did not even have in-house counsel. 
The two outside counsel I spoke with were both in special circum­
stances: one has long acted as a de facto in-house counsel for a 
smaller company; the other represents an entire trade association of 
credit managers who deal with battle-of-the-forms situations. 
The interviews varied in length from about twenty to fifty minutes, 
with the average being about thirty minutes.s3 Not all of the subjects 
were in a position to answer all of my questions, and some of the ques­
tions simply did not apply to certain of the respondents. For example, 
at least some of the companies have gotten to the point where they 
simply never engage, at least to their knowledge, in a battle of the 
forms. For representatives of those companies, I could not ask my 
otherwise standard question, "Why would you knowingly engage in 
the battle of the forms rather than simply resolving all of the boiler­
plate terms in advance?" 
There are a number of ways that one might study how battle-of­
the-forms law works in practice. First, one could do actual raw data 
collection by studying the written records of companies54 or even their 
behavior. Second, one could send out a written survey much like Pro­
fessor Weintraub did in his study of general counsels' attitudes toward 
the law's effect on business.ss The third approach, and the one chosen 
here, is oral interviews. Like the other two approaches, the interview 
approach has its advantages and disadvantages. 
The greatest advantage that I find with the interview approach is 
the ability to ask follow-up questions. Sometimes you discover with 
certain subjects that you are simply asking the wrong question; with a 
written survey, it is harder to pick up on that. In order to achieve this 
advantage to the interview approach, however, you generally cannot 
afford to delegate the task of interviewing to a research assistant. I 
of-the-forms expert within a company, I would call that person, explain the purpose of my 
study, and ask to arrange a later recorded phone interview with him or her. 
Because the interviews were being recorded and because I wanted subjects to be as can­
did as possible, I gave all of the interviewees the option of remaining anonymous for pur­
poses of attribution. Most subjects chose to be anonymous, usually for fear that they might 
unwittingly reveal company strategy or perhaps dirty laundry concerning how they conduct 
their business. Some just did not want to go through whatever channels they would need to 
in order to get their company to agree to be identified. 
53. Full transcripts of all the interviews are available from the author (with identities 
redacted where requested by the subject). 
54. An excellent example of such raw data collection can be found in this symposium 
issue with Ronald J. Mann's article, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 
98 l\1ICH. L. REV. 2494 (2000). 
55. See Weintraub, supra note 3.  
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view the inability to delegate as an advantage of its own, in that the re­
searcher is personally getting the flavor of each and every interview. 
Another key advantage to the interview approach is that it is much 
more manageable to conduct a study that is at least enlightening, if not 
statistically significant. Because each interview can be so deep, you 
can learn a fair amount without the need for hundreds or even dozens 
of subjects. 
The same features of the interview approach that are its strengths 
can also be a source of drawbacks. Because the researcher is asking 
follow-up questions, no two interviews are necessarily going to be the 
same and it is hard to control for the subconscious (or conscious) bi­
ases of the interviewer toward finding a certain conclusion. And be­
cause each individual interview is time-consuming, you are less likely 
to be dealing in sample sizes that will prove to be statistically signifi­
cant. Thus, sample bias is more likely to loom large with the interview 
approach because the number sampled will typically be small. Finally, 
because of the free-ranging nature of the interview approach, it would 
be more difficult to quantify data and run numbers even if you had a 
larger sample size. 
Given that there are literally thousands of companies in this coun­
try that buy and sell goods, anything that I learned from speaking with 
twenty-five such companies can, of course, only be suggestive. There 
may well be confounding variables such as industry or geography or 
company size that would be impossible for me to discern with such a 
small sample size. Regarding sample bias, I will repeat here the la­
ment first uttered by Stewart Macaulay concerning the difficulty of 
trying to screen your sample selection in the absence of much existing 
research in the area: "[T]o a great extent, existing knowledge has 
been inadequate to permit more rigorous procedures - as yet one 
cannot formulate many precise questions to be asked a systematically 
selected sample of 'right people.' "56 
IV. TEsTING FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECTION 2-207 
If one takes the time to read some of the voluminous literature 
that exists concerning the battle of the forms, it quickly becomes clear 
that most of the commentators are making certain factual assumptions 
about the way section 2-207 plays out in practice. Some of these as­
sumptions are specifically stated by the authors; others are implicit in 
what the authors are writing. Below I list four very common assump­
tions that I found in my reading of the literature, and in each case I 
compare what I found in my interviews with the conventional wisdom. 
56. Macaulay, supra note 3, at 56. 
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1. The Battle-of-the-Forms Provision Is a Significant Issue for 
Companies That Buy and Sell Goods 
This assumption is not stated in the literature as such, but it is nev­
ertheless apparent in most of the articles on the subject if you read be­
tween the lines. The sheer number of articles on section 2-207 alone 
suggests that a lot of scholars view the battle of the forms as significant 
enough to share their wisdom with the world. When the revision ef­
forts began for Article 2 of the U.C.C., section 2-207 was at the top of 
many critics' list as one of the provisions that were most in need of 
significant reform.57 
My first clue that section 2-207 wasn't nearly as important in prac­
tice as I thought came when I began trying to set up the interviews for 
this Article. Whenever I would contact the general counsel's office at 
a company, my goal was always to find the one person in the depart­
ment who had the most experience dealing with battle-of-the-forms 
issues. What I quickly discovered was that even at the largest compa­
nies - Fortune 50 companies, in some instances - the most expert 
lawyer in that subject had precious little experience with section 2-207. 
When I note here my surprise at the lack of prominence of section 
2-207 in practice, I am not simply referring to a re-discovery of the 
more generalized Macaulay-esque "law in action" reality that says no 
particular statute or contract dramatically affects commercial behav­
ior. Rather, I am referring to a more specific finding concerning the 
significance of the battle of the forms in particular. 
A. Contract Formation Practices That Eliminate the Battle 
What I found is that nearly half of the twenty-five companies that I 
interviewed were either never or virtually never in a position even to 
engage in a battle of the forms at all, due to the nature of their con­
tract formation practices. Of those companies that sometimes allow 
themselves into a battle-of-the-forms scenario, virtually all of them 
said that post-sale disputes that depended on conflicting forms were 
extremely rare and that litigation on the subject was rarer still.58 
When companies choose to opt out of the battle of the forms, 
whether consciously or subconsciously, they do so in a variety of dif­
ferent ways: 1) A couple of respondents indicated that the vendors in 
57. In the May 1, 1999 Proposed Final Draft of revised Article 2 that was approved by 
the American Law Institute, section 2-207 was one of eight parts of Article 2 that was identi· 
fied by the drafters as having been the subject of "the most important changes in Revised 
Article 2." Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2: Sales, reporter's memorandum at 
xxiv (Proposed Final Draft May 1, 1999) (draft available upon request from the author). 
58. One question that I did not ask my subjects that, in hindsight, I clearly should have 
was how the frequency of battle-of-the-forms disputes compared with the frequency of other 
sales contract disputes that were not related to the battle of the forms. 
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their deals will virtually never send an acknowledgment form or, if 
they do, it merely acknowledges that the sales agreement was reached 
but does not include any terms beyond the ones that were already ne­
gotiated;59 2) The Director of Purchasing for a medium-sized plastics 
manufacturer indicated that he always negotiates all terms with the 
seller prior to sending the purchase order and that the purchase order 
includes those pre-negotiated terms;60 3) For some of the larger com­
panies, practically the only sales that they will conduct are with long­
term customers who agree in advance to sign a master agreement that 
includes all terms and conditions that will govern any future orders;61 
4) One large computer manufacturer requires that any purchaser must 
sign in advance a form prepared by that manufacturer that outlines all 
of the terms and conditions that will govern future purchases;62 5) 
Some companies require that the credit application that a purchaser 
must sign in order to be eligible for credit also include the purchaser's 
assent in advance to all of the vendor's terms and conditions;63 6) A 
couple of large retail purchasers send to any prospective vendor a 
"vendor's handbook" that describes the purchaser's terms and condi­
tions on which it will do business with the vendor, and the vendor 
must agree to those terms before selling to the purchaser;64 and 7) 
With some, though not most, Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI") 
arrangements, the EDI Trading Partner Agreement, that both sides 
sign at the front end of the relationship, will also include all terms and 
conditions of future sales.65 
B. Determining When a Fully Dickered Contract Is Warranted 
Even companies that have not eliminated completely the possibil­
ity of a battle of the forms nevertheless have to determine when a par­
ticular sales contract is significant enough to warrant a fully dickered 
contract signed by both sides. On this question, most companies in­
terviewed did not have specific dollar-size or other well-defined pa­
rameters by which to measure whether a certain deal was worth cre­
ating its own fully negotiated contract. Because there were typically 
59. See Interview No. 2 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 5 (transcript 
at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 24 (transcript at 5) (on file with author). 
60. See Interview No. 15 (transcript at 2-3) (on file with author). 
61. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 4-5) (on file with author); Interview No. 14 (tran-
script at 3-5) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (transcript at7) (on file with author). 
62. See Interview No. 23 (transcript at 4) (on file with author). 
63. See Interview No. 16 (transcript at 2) (on file with author). 
64. See Interview No. 20 (transcript at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 25 (tran­
script at 2-3) (on file with author). 
65. See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 21 (tran­
script at 3-4) (on file with author); Interview No. 22 (transcript at 4-5) (on file with author). 
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no set thresholds, companies tended to take an ad hoc approach that 
considered various factors that would weigh in favor of doing a truly 
integrated contract: the overall size of the deal, the likelihood that a 
particular buyer-seller relationship would end up being long term, the 
reputation of the company on the other side, and any risk that was 
perceived to be unusual. For example, one company would never al­
low itself into a battle-of-the-forms scenario with a non-U.S. company, 
because the U.C.C. might not apply to the transaction.66 Another 
company indicated that any time the other side objected to boilerplate 
language in its form, the company would simply negotiate a real con­
tract rather than fight about the terms in one side's form.67 
C. Frequency of Post-performance Disputes About Conflicting Terms 
Even where companies enter into a battle of the forms, they rarely 
find themselves in a position where the differences in the nonimmedi­
ate terms matter. The most common reason suggested for the infre­
quency of after-the-fact disputes about conflicting forms is that in 
most cases the value of the relationship to both parties will exceed 
whatever amount is in controversy.68 The Vice-President of Finance 
for a medium-sized furniture manufacturer explained that his com­
pany might see about three such disputes in a year.69 Even those few 
disputes, he said, almost always get worked out, with a focus on 
whether either side was at fault and what would be fair, and with an 
eye toward continuing the business relationship if at all possible.70 The 
in-house counsel for a major department store retailer gave this suc­
cinct reason for why after-the-fact form disputes don't typically 
amount to much: "We're more interested in being in the retail busi­
ness . . .  [than] in the litigation business of trying to collect money."71 
Respondents suggested two situations when a battle-of-the-forms 
dispute might actually come to litigation. The first is when potentially 
massive consequential damages are at stake that could prove more 
significant than even the value of the ongoing relationship to each 
party.72 The second is when the overall relationship between the 
66. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 7) (on file with author). The U.N. Convention on 
Contracts of the Sale of Goods ("CISG") uses a version of the last-shot and mirror-image 
rules. CISG arts. 18-19, 19 I.S.M. 668, 675-76 (1980). 
67. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 4) (on file with author). 
68. For a thorough treatment of the dynamics of settlement, see Samuel R. Gross & 
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1 (1996). 
69. See Interview No. 11 (transcript at 4) (on file with author). 
70. See id. 
71. Interview No. 25 (transcript at 6) (on file with author). 
72 See Interview No. 19 (transcript at 5-6) (on file with author). 
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buyer and the seller has somehow soured and one of the parties is just 
looking to pick a fight. As the in-house counsel for a major office 
products manufacturer put it, when the battle of the forms becomes a 
litigable issue, it is usually a sign that the "dealO [has] just gone bad."73 
A lawyer who works extensively with vendors' credit managers sug­
gested that in some cases in which a purchaser cannot or will not pay a 
debt for goods delivered, the purchaser will raise some type of battle­
of-the-forms issue as a defense to payment.74 
2. When Companies Do Engage in the Battle of the Forms, 
They Do So Because It Is Efficient 
One question that an outsider to the battle of the forms might 
rightly ask is, why would you knowingly perform a contract where you 
haven't first agreed with the other side on all of the significant terms? 
Most of the academic literature on section 2-207 seems to assume ei­
ther explicitly or implicitly that the reason companies engage in a bat­
tle of the forms is that it makes sense according to the following cost­
benefit analysis: At least for some sales contracts, the costs of re­
viewing and then negotiating about nonimmediate terms are simply 
not worth the benefit, given the low likelihood of a future dispute 
about these terms and the relatively low cost of losing such a dispute if 
there is one.75 
The overwhelming majority of company representatives with 
whom I spoke would agree with the academics on this one. The in­
house counsel for a major consumer appliance manufacturer justified 
her company's engaging in the battle of the forms this way: "It's effi­
ciency, and it's an ability to get business done."76 Several respondents 
73. Interview No. 17 (transcript at 8) (on file with author). 
74. See Interview No. 16 (transcript at 6) (on file with author). 
75. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: Optimal 
Institutional Design for Regulating Incomplete Contracts 16-17 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, 
Legal Studies Working Paper Series 1999), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf? 
abstractid+169276> (positing that one reason why contracting parties create incomplete con­
tracts is that the cost of bargaining about all contingencies exceeds the benefits); Morris G. 
Shanker, Are You Losing the Battle of Sales Forms?, 5 CORP. COUNS. Q. 36, 50-51 (1989) 
(suggesting that lawyers should advise clients to decide which sales contracts are significant 
enough that it is worth the time to sit down and work out the details, but the client needs to 
decide which deals would be encompassed by such an approach); Robert M. Rosh, Note, 
Demilitarizing the Battle of the Forms: A Peace Proposal, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 553, 
562-563 (arguing that the battle of the forms may well be economically efficient, as corpora­
tions seem to have concluded, given the relatively few number of disputes that arise later); 
James J. White, Autistic Contracts, at 3-4 (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author) (contending that parties probably rationally conclude that sales contracts with less 
than ideal terms are better than no contracts at all and are also better than ideal contracts 
that include a high cost for negotiating, particularly since the number of contracts can be 
large, the number of problem contracts can be small, and the size of each resultant problem 
tends not to be huge). 
76. Interview No. 10 (transcript at 12) (on file with author). 
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emphasized that even if there was some sort of dispute later on, the 
resolution of that dispute would end up depending more upon the 
quality of the particular relationship than upon what either form said. 
As the lawyer for a paper products manufacturer put it, "[A] couple of 
golf games can get a lot solved. "77 
In the efficiency equation that sometimes dictates a battle of the 
forms, there are a number of costs that are saved by engaging in the 
battle. First, there is the overall cost of people's time that it would 
take to negotiate all of the nonimmediate terms of the contract.78 A 
second time-related cost that is saved by the battle of the forms is the 
cost of delay.79 Sometimes the circumstances will dictate that a par­
ticular sale needs to be a rush order, and the back-and-forth of a full 
negotiation would be virtually impossible to pull off in that setting. 
A third cost avoided by engaging in a battle of the forms is perhaps 
psychological. At the front end of a deal, why would a business person 
want to raise such nasty prospects as future disputes over noncon­
forming goods?80 Most young couples engaged to be married don't 
choose to negotiate pre-nuptial agreements, yet the odds of a break­
down there are a lot greater than the odds of a product going bad with 
any particular sale. And while buyers and sellers aren't exactly "love 
birds" like our hypothetical newlyweds, virtually all of the respondents 
I spoke with emphasized at one point or another the vast importance 
of a strong working relationship between the two sides in long-term 
supply contracts. 
Some of the in-house lawyers that were interviewed pointed to the 
different perspectives of lawyers and business people as one reason 
why nonmatching forms are sometimes allowed to serve as contracts.81 
Whereas the lawyers tend to be more risk averse, the business people 
who are on the front lines of these deals have very little reason to want 
to compare nonimmediate terms on the forms and bring them to the 
attention of the lawyers. Furthermore, there is the reality that these 
business people are not generally reading the forms anyway. 
A couple of the in-house lawyers whose companies are primarily 
purchasers also mentioned that part of their comfort level with en­
gaging in the battle of the forms stems from the generally favorable 
77. Interview No. 6 (transcript at 12) (on file with author). 
78. See Interview No. 4 (transcript at 7) (on file with author); Interview No. 11 (tran­
script at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (transcript at 6) (on file with author). 
79. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 18 (tran­
script at 4) (on file with author); Interview No. 22 (transcript at 8) (on file with author). 
80. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 6) (on file with author). 
81. See Interview No. 6 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 7 (transcript 
at 8-9) (on file with author); Interview No. 16 (transcript at 4) (on file with author). 
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treatment that the U.C.C. gap-fillers accord to buyers.82 As discussed 
above in Part I, although no party can assure that its terms will prevail 
in the battle of the forms, it is fairly easy to draft your forms to assure 
that you at least end up with the gap-fillers. For purchasers, that 
means access to the broad implied warranties and to all available 
remedies, including consequential damages. 
3. Parties Uniformly Draft Their Forms to Be as One-Sided 
as Possible in Their Favor 
This commonly held assumption in the literature certainly has an 
intuitive appeal to it.83 After all, why not try to get all that you can for 
your side on the boilerplate terms, particularly if the other side is not 
paying that much attention to them anyway? Certainly this assump­
tion did prove true for most of the companies that I interviewed. On 
the other hand, this approach was far from universal, and there were a 
few respondents who described their company's conscious effort to 
draft their forms in a more balanced fashion from the start. In the 
end, I could delineate three categories of approaches that companies 
took to this issue: 1) draft the forms as one-sidedly as possible for the 
company's benefit; 2) try to protect the company's interests on issues 
that matter to the company, but don't needlessly overreach or include 
terms that are oppressive to the other side; and 3) draft a form from 
the start that is very balanced and reasonable and that your company 
would be comfortable with if it were on the other side. 
Those who took the first approach generally justified it on the 
grounds that this was probably what the other side was going to do, so 
it was as much a defensive move as anything else. As the in-house 
lawyer for a consumer appliance manufacturer explained, her com­
pany's purchase orders were not meant to be neutral in any sense be­
cause the company wanted to make sure that it at least knocked out all 
of the vendor's one-sided terms on their forms.84 
Those companies espousing the second approach recognize the 
need to protect their interests but also appreciate the potential cost of 
being overbearing to the other side. The in-house counsel for a manu­
facturer of office products claimed that his company's forms tended to 
82 See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 7) (on file with author); Interview No. 25 (tran­
script at 8) (on file with author). 
83. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 162 n.27 (indicating that virtually everyone agrees 
that the employees who deal with these forms don't take the time to read what's on them, 
which gives both sides an incentive to make their forms as one-sided as possible); 
Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 627 (reporting that in his reading of the extensive literature on 
section 2-207 most of the models for reform assume that the parties use one-sided boiler­
plate terms in their forms). 
84. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 2) (on file with author). 
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be more balanced and reasonable than most.85 The one instance 
where his company takes a hard line on the forms, this lawyer said, is 
where it is selling a smaller part that will be part of a larger product. 
In that case, the company will insist on a limitation of liability that is 
appropriate to the relatively small benefit that it is getting out of the 
sale.86 
A third approach is represented by three large companies that 
claim their forms are unusually balanced from the start.87 Within this 
category, a couple of respondents indicated that their companies had 
recently undergone a major shift of policy on how to draft their forms. 
The in-house counsel for an aircraft manufacturer explained how his 
company had decided to shift from very one-sided terms in its form to 
much more balanced and reasonable terms. The reason for the shift in 
policy was efficiency, namely that the new approach saves the com­
pany time "arguing over things that you are going to end up losing 
anyway in negotiations."88 The in-house counsel for a computer 
manufacturer described how a few years ago his company changed its 
forms to those that are more balanced than they are one-sided, with 
the goal that the forms be put in plain English that a ninth grader can 
read. The same lawyer described how his company once ended up in a 
deal in which its own form was used as a starting point for the other 
side, and there were actually very few terms that he felt he needed to 
change to protect his company.89 
What is interesting about this final group of large companies is that 
all three of them have a more or less take-it-or-leave-it approach to 
their forms. Thus, the battle of the forms ends up being not very rele­
vant to a company such as these three that has the leverage to insist on 
the other side signing its form. More significantly, because a large 
company like this suspects that the other side is likely to read the form 
(given that it will be asked to sign it), there is perhaps a greater ten­
dency to draft the form in a way that compromises on issues that are 
nonessential to the drafter. Given the small number of companies in 
this category, this finding is only suggestive but would be an interest­
ing subject to focus on in a later study. 
85. See lnterview No. 17 (transcript at 5) (on file with author). 
86. See id. 
87. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 20 (tran· 
script at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 23 (transcript at 2) (on file with author). Cer· 
tainly one could question the veracity of such self-serving statements concerning the "bal­
ance" of one's own forms. On the other hand, as noted above in the text, most respondents 
admitted that their forms were in fact fairly one-sided. 
88. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 3) (on file with author). 
89. See Interview No. 23 (transcript at 2) (on file with author). 
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4. Nobody Reads the Forms 
Perhaps a more precise way to articulate this very prevalent as­
sumption in the section 2-207 literature is that nobody reads the 
boilerplate or nonimmediate terms on the forms. While clearly there 
is a lot of truth to this assumption, my interviews suggest that there are 
at least some levels of nuance to the issue. Because the nonreading of 
forms seems to be such a central and universal assumption in the lit­
erature,90 I approached the issue in my interviews with three discrete 
but related questions: 1) What proportion of your vendors or pur­
chasers do you think actually read all or most of the boilerplate terms 
on your form?; 2) How commonly does the other side object to a term 
or terms in your form, and if they do, which terms are usually at is­
sue?; and 3) When you receive the other side's form, to what extent 
does someone in your company read the terms on the form? 
About half of the respondents believed that the other side either 
never or rarely read the forms that their companies sent to them. On 
the other hand, about half of the company representatives indicated 
their belief that at least some of the companies on the other side were 
reading their forms, depending on a variety of factors. Several sub­
jects indicated that the other side would read their form at least at the 
outset if they were a new customer, and particularly if a long-term 
supply relationship were contemplated.91 One respondent opined that 
large companies are more likely to have someone reading the forms 
than are small companies.92 Another company representative indi­
cated a belief that in his dealings, more purchasers than vendors on 
the other side react to his company's forms;93 conversely, a different 
subject suggested that vendors are more likely than purchasers to read 
her company's forms.94 
Probably the surest indication that the other side is reading your 
company's form is when they object to some term within it. The con­
sensus on this question was that it rarely happens, and when it does, it 
is much more likely to be with a large-dollar purchaser or a large-
90. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 627 (noting that an assumption of most reform 
models for section 2-207 is that neither side's sales personnel read the forms as to boilerplate 
terms); Murray, Chaos, supra note 48, at 1317-18 (reporting his experience with "more than 
5,000 purchasing agents" that convinced him that these agents never read the forms of sell­
ers); Travalio, supra note 37, at 375-76 (expressing doubt that buyers really either read or are 
aware of the one-sided fine print on sellers' forms). But see Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, 
at 1251-52 (suggesting that at least some parties will read the forms). 
91. See Interview No. 11 (transcript at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (tran­
script at 3) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); In­
terview No. 24 (transcript at 2) (on file with author). 
92 See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 3) (on file with author). 
93. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 3-4) (on file with author). 
94. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 2) (on file with author). 
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dollar vendor.95 When there is an objection to a term on a form, my 
study suggests that the objection tends to focus on warranties or 
remedies, especially consequential damages.96 At the point when an 
objection is registered, the procedure at most companies with which I 
spoke is for the business side and the legal side to work together to de­
termine both the importance of the provision at issue from a legal 
standpoint and the economic significance of preserving this particular 
deal.97 
Most respondents admitted that their own company's employees 
never or rarely read what was on the other side's form beyond the 
dickered terms of the deal. Some subjects, however, said that the an­
swer sometimes depends on certain factors. More than one in-house 
lawyer indicated their belief that if they have taught their business 
people anything, it is never to actually sign the other side's form with­
out first reading it and consulting the law department.98 A couple of 
subjects indicated that someone in their company would read the 
terms and conditions on the other side's form where it was a particu­
larly large deal that for some reason still did not warrant a fully inte­
grated contract.99 Finally, a couple of subjects said that whether the 
other side's form was read would depend in part on which employee 
received it, with lower-level employees being much less likely to read 
the boilerplate than higher-level employees.100 
V. SPECIFIC REFORM PROPOSALS 
As alluded to earlier, lawyers and academics have articulated a 
number of different reform proposals to clean up the current battle-of­
the-forms statute. For purposes of my interviews, I have focused on 
three of those proposals. The first two were suggested by prominent 
academics and are appealing to me because they are so radically dif­
ferent from most of the other proposals which are out there. The third 
proposal is a sort of thumbnail sketch of where the Article 2 revision 
process seems destined to end up; that proposal has also been greatly 
95. See, e.g., Interview No. 3 (transcript at 3) (on file with author); Interview No. 8 
{transcript at 5) (on file with author). 
96. See Interview No. 4 (transcript at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (tran­
script at 4) (on file with author); Interview No. 13 (transcript at page 3) (on file with author); 
and Interview No. 24 (transcript at 3) (on file with author). 
97. See, e.g., Interview No. 13 (transcript at 3-4) (on file with author); and Interview No. 
16 (transcript at 5) (on file with author). 
98. See Interview No. 7 (transcript at 4) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (tran­
script at 9) (on file with author); Interview No. 19 (transcript at 7) (on file with author). 
99. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 18 (tran­
script at 4) (on file with author). 
100. See Interview No. 22 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author); Interview No. 25 
(transcript at 7) (on file with author). 
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influenced by a number of similar proposals that have been articulated 
by such academics as Professor Murray. 
Given the small size of my sample, I would . be hard-pressed to 
generalize even about the factual patterns that I found. There are still 
additional reasons beyond sample size to question the value of the re­
actions from my subjects to the specific reform proposals that follow. 
First, there is likely to be a status-quo bias among those in the field.101 
Second, there is less reason to think that those practicing in the field 
are in a better position than academics to predict the effects of a 
change in the law, even if they are clearly in a better position to report 
on the facts of their own company's existing practices. Nevertheless, I 
asked subjects about these reform proposals to see if perhaps there 
were nonobvious factors at work that the proposals had not consid­
ered. 
1. The Baird-Weisberg Model 
After seeing the Baird-Weisberg proposal, one might accuse these 
two academics of going "retro" on us. Essentially, Professors Baird 
and Weisberg suggest that we actually would be better off with a re­
turn to the common law "mirror image" and "last shot" doctrines.102 
While at first glance such a proposal might not sound that interesting, 
the arguments that the two authors make for their proposal are clearly 
thought-provoking and arguably compelling. 
Professors Baird and Weisberg begin by taking issue with most 
commentators' aversion to the formalist approach that is represented 
by the mirror-image rule. The two authors point out that critics of the 
common law approach have probably overestimated the extent to 
which that approach would sanction opportunistic behavior.103 The 
fear has been that the common law approach would allow parties to 
use slight differences in boilerplate terms to back out of contracts 
where there truly has been a meeting of the minds. The authors argue 
that courts can handle the problem of the reneging party within the 
existing framework of the mirror-image rule by construing the "mirror 
image" concept either broadly or narrowly, depending on the court's 
sense of whether a party is simply using the rule to be opportunistic.104 
Professors Baird and Weisberg also anticipate the criticism that the 
last-shot doctrine may in practice favor the seller, who tends to fire the 
last shot in the typical battle-of-the-forms case. Their response is that 
101. On the general tendency to overrate legal risks, see Donald C. Langevoort & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal 
Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997). 
102. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9. 
103. See id. at 1223. 
104. See id. at 1231-37. 
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it is not necessarily unfair to have a rule that favors one side or the 
other, as long as the rule is clear from the beginning and both parties 
know it.105 Under those circumstances, the party that is unhappy with 
the default form can simply bargain around the terms that it does not 
like. 
The key benefit of the common law rule to the battle of the forms, 
according to the Baird-Weisberg theory, is that it doesn't force parties 
to use default terms such as the U.C.C. gap-fillers that may not be 
well-suited to either party's interest. Instead, the mirror-image rule 
gives both parties an incentive to craft their forms in ways that reflect 
the reality of their industry or the marketplace more generally.106 
Professors Baird and Weisberg argue that because at least some 
parties will read the forms, the mirror-image rule encourages parties 
to draft provisions that advance the mutual interests of buyer and 
seller.107 If a party persists in writing one-sided terms on its form, it 
will risk losing business since the other side is more likely to read a 
form that it knows it might be bound by. The two authors stress that 
effectively it only takes a minority of parties reading their forms to en­
courage the form drafters not to be unfairly one-sided.103 The problem 
with a regime like section 2-207, in which U.C.C. gap-fillers are more 
likely to control, is that parties have less of an incentive to read forms 
since the terms on those forms probably won't bind them anyway. 
Drafting parties, in turn, will have less reason to draft forms with any 
thought of the other side's interests in mind.109 
The Baird-Weisberg model is premised on two key factual assump­
tions about the behavior of parties in battle-of-the-forms scenarios: 1) 
That at least some parties will read the other side's forms closely; and 
2) That parties will change terms on their forms if less than a majority 
of those receiving the forms object to those terms. The interviews that 
I conducted suggest that the two authors are probably right on both 
counts; nevertheless, their general proposal was not especially popular 
with the subjects whom I asked. 
Concerning their first assumption, as indicated earlier in this Arti­
cle, at least some parties already read the other side's forms for at 
least certain kinds of deals.110 And remember, too, that the reading of 
forms that already occurs is in a regime in which it is less likely that 
the recipient of the form will end up being bound by the form's terms. 
Were the mirror-image rule to become the prevailing law, then still 
105. See id. at 1249 n.80. 
106. See id. at 1223. 
107. See id. at 1251-52. 
108. See id. at 1253-54. 
109. See id. at 1255-56. 
110. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text. 
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more parties ought to be reading the other side's forms, given the in­
creased likelihood that a party would end up being bound by terms on 
the other side's form. Several respondents in my interviews indicated 
that they believed this would be the case.111 
As to the second assumption, I posed that question directly to at 
least some of the subjects I interviewed: "Would an objection to a 
given term by one or more vendors or purchasers cause you to change 
your form as to that term for all vendors or purchasers?" A minority 
of those responding said that they would not change their form, but 
most who answered the question said that they would likely change 
their form if the objection were fairly frequent and the term were not 
critically important to their side.112 As an in-house lawyer for a major 
food-product manufacturer explained, if a term that was commonly 
objected to were not that important to your side, it would be more ef­
ficient simply to change it in your form than to have to negotiate it 
frequently.113 Some terms, though, this lawyer said, would not be 
changed based on frequent objections by the other side because they 
are just too important to the company that drafted the form.114 
A few of the respondents indicated that they had already changed 
their forms to anticipate objections on issues that aren't that signifi­
cant to them.115 The new approach, according to an in-house lawyer 
for an aircraft manufacturer, is to consider terms that are frequently 
objected to which aren't that valuable to the company and just to 
change them on the forms in advance so as to save a lot of time.116 
As noted earlier, what is most striking about this small group of 
large companies is that all of them have the leverage to require a take­
it-or-leave-it approach to their forms. In a sense, these three compa­
nies are directly testing the Baird-Weisberg hypothesis: the other side 
knows in advance that if it wants to deal with the large company, it will 
be stuck with the terms on the large company's form; the recipient of 
the form thus has a greater incentive to read the terms on the form; 
and, in tum, the drafter of the form finds it more efficient to draft 
terms that are more balanced from the start than to waste time negoti-
111. See, e.g., Interview No. 19 (transcript at 9) ("I think we would probably have to 
start looking at vendors' forms" if a mirror-image regime were in place.) (on file with 
author); Interview No. 21 (transcript at 6) (predicting that there would be much more focus 
on the agreements in advance in a mirror-image system) (on file with author). 
112 See, e.g., InterviewNo. 17 (transcript at7) ("I think it's fair to say that . . .  we would 
revisit something if we got lots of flack about it.") (on file with author). 
113. See Interview No. 19 (transcript at 5) (on file with author). 
114. See id. 
115. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at page 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 20 
(transcript at page 2) (on file with author); and Interview No. 23 (transcript at page 2) (on 
file with author). 
116. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 3) (on file with author). 
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ating about terms that are not that important to the large company 
that is drafting the form. 
Despite the fact that the factual assumptions underlying the Baird­
Weisberg proposal were generally supported by the results of my in­
terviews, the proposal itself received less than enthusiastic reactions 
from the subjects to whom it was posed. Part of it may be due to a 
general aversion to the costs of change or an overrating of the risks of 
change.117 Part of this may be due to the fact that the respondents 
were given a bare-bones sketch of the proposal without the accompa­
nying articulation of why the proposal would be an improvement over 
what we have now. My own reaction to the proposal, for example, 
changed considerably between when I first heard it and when I read 
carefully the article that explains its rationale. 
All of this is not to say that the Baird-Weisberg proposal did not 
have its fans among those with whom I spoke. One respondent liked 
the certainty of this approach compared to what we have now in sec­
tion 2-207.118 Another subject speculated that whoever's form con­
trolled under the Baird-Weisberg approach could not draft its form in 
too one-sided a fashion or it would backfire. According to this sub­
ject, even if the vendor's form were the last shot, the vendor would 
still have an incentive not to overreach. In drafting its form, the ven­
dor would need to consider that when the purchaser saw the vendor's 
form, the vendor who drafted a one-sided form would risk "screw[ing] 
up their future relationship . . .  [it] might be wonderful from a legal 
standpoint [to make a one-sided form] but it's suicide from a business 
standpoint. "119 
The objections to the Baird-Weisberg proposal took various forms. 
Some subjects suggested that this proposal would likely force the par­
ties into negotiations about boilerplate terms that would be time­
consuming and ultimately not worth it.120 One respondent opined, "It 
would be a more definite world, but from our perspective a more time­
consuming and expensive world."121 Another subject said that this 
proposal wouldn't work well for large companies, because you can't sit 
down and negotiate every deal, and every vendor is likely to have a 
different form.122 
117. See generally Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 101. 
118. See Interview No. 22 (transcript at 9) (on file with author). 
119. Interview No. 17 (transcript at 13) (on file with author). 
120. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 10) (on file with author); Interview No. 10 (tran­
script at 9-10) (on file with author); Interview No. 11 (transcript at 5) (on file with author); 
Interview No. 18 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author); Interview No. 19 (transcript at 9) 
(on file with author). 
121. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 10) (on file with author). 
122 See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 9-10) (on file with author). 
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Another group of respondents believed that the Baird-Weisberg 
proposal would probably cause parties to insist that the other side sign 
their form, and that ultimately this approach would simply end up 
testing which side had the most leverage.123 One subject didn't like the 
proposal because he felt it would give too much leverage to whoever's 
form would prevail in its entirety; this same subject believed the pro­
posal would force lots of negotiations with the end result that a com­
pany would use several different forms depending on the leverage of 
the other side.124 
Although one respondent liked the certainty of the Baird­
Weisberg approach, a few other subjects mentioned that they actually 
preferred the uncertainty of the current law. The former General 
Counsel of a major chemical manufacturer indicated his belief from 
practice that the uncertainty of the current battle of the forms actually 
helps solve disputes when they arise, because neither side is sure that 
they're going to win.125 One of the subjects who is a business person 
rather than a lawyer argued that "the confusion [of the current ap­
proach] in some ways is almost good because it provides just enough 
doubt in the mind of someone that they say, 'Do I really want to go 
through this or should I get my focus back on what our core business is 
here?' "126 
My own view of the Baird-Weisberg proposal is that it would 
probably work out better in practice than most of the skeptics from 
my pool of subjects believed. Clearly there would be an initial cost of 
transition as parties engaged in whatever negotiations and changing of 
their forms that they felt was warranted by the new rule. When eve­
ryone settled into the new system, my guess is that you would see 
forms that were not as one-sided as under the current system. So I 
think that the rule would probably yield the benefit of fewer contracts 
in which the nonimmediate terms were the often sub-optimal U.C.C. 
default terms. 
My only question is whether the cost of such a switch in rules 
would be worth the benefit. That is a question whose answer requires 
further study. My sense from the very limited sample that I was 
working with is that the current costs of sub-optimal default terms 
generated by the present section 2-207 are not that great. Put another 
way, the sub-optimal default terms of the U.C.C. may indeed be out 
there now, but they don't seem to matter that much in the vast major­
ity of cases, maybe in part because so many firms have already opted 
123. See Interview No. 9 (transcript at 11) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (tran­
script at 10) (on file with author); Interview No. 13 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author); 
Interview No. 16 (transcript at 7) (on file with author). 
124. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 10) (on file with author). 
125. See Interview No. 4 (transcript at 9) (on file with author). 
126. Interview No. 11 (transcript at 6) (on file with author). 
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out of the battle of the forms anyway. On the other hand, there may 
be costs to these default terms within the present system that exist but 
are simply not evident to either me or the subjects with whom I spoke. 
2. The Goldberg Model 
The approach to the battle of the forms espoused by Professor 
Goldberg is fairly straightforward.127 Under the "best shot" rule, as he 
calls it, a court faced with a battle-of-the-forms issue would be re­
quired to choose whichever of the two forms is fairer, or closer to the 
center. That form would then govern the transaction in its entirety. 
Just like with final-offer arbitration, after which this approach is mod­
eled, each side would arguably have an incentive to draft its form with 
the other side's interests in mind.128 
The problem \vith both the mirror-image rule and the knockout 
rule, according to Professor Goldberg, is that buyers and sellers who 
know that their form will prevail might be willing to risk losing busi­
ness by making their forms extremely one-sided. This would be the 
case if they believe that few parties will read the forms anyway and 
that there will be significant benefit in having their form govern with 
the majority of the parties that will not bother to read the form.129 
In the opinion of those individuals I interviewed, the Goldberg 
model fared slightly better than the Baird-Weisberg approach, but not 
by much. There were several subjects who thought that the proposal 
would indeed achieve its desired objective of causing parties to draft 
more evenhandedly from the start. "I think that's a phenomenal idea 
because I am a big fan of final offer arbitration," said one lawyer who 
represents several companies and credit managers.130 One respondent 
liked the fact that in response to this proposal, you could change your 
form just once and thereafter would not need to negotiate forms con­
stantly.131 Another subject, though, questioned whether a judge could 
really compare the relative "fairness" of, say, a very detailed purchase 
order with a bare-bones acknowledgment form that hardly contained 
any terms.132 
The biggest objection to the "best shot" rule was a general discom­
fort with the notion of a judge who is not intimately familiar with a 
deal having to make an either/or choice between two forms, particu­
larly when the dispute is typically focused on a single issue or two. 
127. See Goldberg, supra note 5. 
128. See id. at 166. 
129. See id. at 165. 
130. Interview No. 16 (transcript at 8) (on file with author). 
131. See Interview No. 7 (transcript at 9-10) (on file with author). 
132 See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 8) (on file with author). 
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One in-house counsel said, "I personally would never want a judge de­
ciding what was fair in my business."133 Another company lawyer said, 
"I'd hate to have some outside party make my deal for me."134 Yet a 
third lawyer that worked in-house argued that the proposal "[k]ind of 
takes contract law, and throws it out the window, doesn't it?"135 
Interestingly, some of the same lawyers who are comfortable with 
the uncertainty of current section 2-207 and Article 2's default provi­
sions get nervous at the thought of an unknown judge picking one 
side's form or the other's. The "best shot" proposal "might cause 
somebody a pause for thinking [at the time they are drafting their 
form]," said one in-house lawyer, "but it's a roll of the dice."136 The 
either/or nature of the "best shot" rule particularly troubled one com­
pany's lawyer: "I'd rather have the [decisionmaker] say, 'Okay, I'll 
make a decision and it will be a decision that's fair to both parties,' if 
you get to that point."137 
3. Approach of the Article 2 Revision Project 
Although final approval of revised Article 2 was postponed this 
summer by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, further work on this project is unlikely to affect signifi­
cantly the approach that is being taken to revising section 2-207.138 
The key goals of that approach seem to be twofold: 1) to de-couple 
the issues of formation and terms, so that revised section 2-207 will 
deal solely with the terms of a contract rather than with the timing and 
existence of its formation; and 2) to simplify the mechanics of section 
2-207 so that the question of terms is simply whether the terms on the 
two forms match, and if they don't, having the U.C.C. gap-fillers apply 
in the absence of clear assent by one side to the other's nonmatching 
terms. Under this simplified approach, we would no longer need to 
ask: which form was the offer and which was the acceptance; whether 
a term was additional or different; whether an additional term consti­
tuted a material alteration; or any of the other factual and legal ques­
tions that make it difficult to determine under the current section 2-
207 just when the gap-fillers kick in. 
133. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 12) (on file with author). 
134. Interview No. 22 (transcript at 9) (on file with author). 
135. Interview No. 19 (transcript at 10) (on file with author). 
136. Interview No. 10 (transcript at 10) (on file with author). 
137. Interview No. 12 (transcript at 10) (on file with author). 
138. For example, the Reporter's Note to section 2-207 in the November 1999 Article 2 
Revision Draft (on file with the author) says at page 26, "The approach taken here is consis­
tent with the approach taken in the July draft, but a number of changes have been made for 
the sake of clarity." U.C.C. § 2-207 reporter's note 26 (Reporter's Interim Draft Nov. 1999) 
(on file with author). 
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Among the group of individuals that I interviewed, the approach 
of the Article 2 revision project was the clear favorite. Said one gen­
eral counsel: "I think that would be the consensus of most of the peo­
ple who have my job."139 Most subjects felt that this approach made 
the most sense, although one respondent who favored this approach 
still wished that somehow the Code drafters could also convey the 
gap-fillers more succinctly and in plain English.140 A couple of re­
spondents thought that the revision project's approach would end up 
being little different than what we have now, given that it is easy 
enough in the current regime for everyone to draft his or her forms so 
as to create a knockout situation anyway.141 
A few subjects did not prefer the revision project's approach, one 
because he thought it would create too much certainty142 and another 
because he thought it would create too much uncertainty.143 Yet a 
third subject thought that the apparent certainty created by this pro­
posed revision would be illusory, since it is often hard to say when the 
terms on two forms agree.144 This same lawyer further argued that a 
push toward greater use of the gap-fillers is not necessarily a good 
thing given that they are so favorable to the buyer.145 
VI. THE FuTURE OF THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
When we think about the future, we think of the "paperless" soci­
ety, and to some extent that is already beginning to occur in sales-of­
goods transactions. With respect to the battle of the forms, though, I 
think it would be a mistake to think that even a paper-less society will 
solve the underlying cause for why we have such battles in the first 
place. If buyers and sellers would rather not spend the time and effort 
negotiating nonimmediate contract terms in a papered society, 
whether for reasons of efficiency or psychology or otherwise, then 
doing business in an "e-world" may not change things that much. 
Clearly there will be cost savings of some kind in a world of electronic 
commerce, but most of these savings will not directly reduce the costs 
of negotiating about nonimmediate terms. 
My interviews suggest that there are at least four developments in 
the sales of goods arena that may affect the way that sales transactions 
139. Interview No. 9 (transcript at 12) (on file with author). 
140. See Interview No. 11 (transcript at 7) (on file with author). 
141. See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 9) (on file with author); Interview No. 21 (tran-
script at 7-8) (on file with author). 
142 See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 13-14) (on file with author). 
143. See Interview No. 16 (transcript at 8) (on file with author}. 
144. See Interview No. 17 (transcript at 14) (on file with author). 
145. See id. 
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are conducted in the future. The first two of these four are technol­
ogy-based, but ironically it is the latter two, non-technology develop­
ments that may have the greatest effect on the future of the battle of 
the forms. 
The first development is the increasing use by companies of Elec­
tronic Data Interchange ("EDI") in making their purchase orders. 
With EDI, a purchasing company sends its purchase order to the ven­
dor via electronic mail according to a prearranged format between the 
buyer and the seller.146 Most, but not all, of the companies I inter­
viewed are now either using or receiving an increasing percentage of 
their purchase orders through EDI. Even though the use of EDI re­
quires that both buyer and seller sign in advance an EDI Trading 
Partner Agreement, most companies do not also use that occasion to 
work out the general terms and conditions of the sale beyond the is­
sues surrounding the electronic mode of communication. As one law­
yer explained, since it is generally the Information Services people 
that are setting up the EDI arrangement, "they just want a form that 
deals with their issue. "147 
Some purchasers will try to use the occasion of an EDI arrange­
ment to get the vendor to agree to its terms and conditions with each 
EDI order: it's the "click here and you agree . . .  " syndrome. For 
most purchasers, the attempt doesn't succeed. The in-house lawyer 
for a large manufacturer explained that his company is seeing much 
more EDI both as a purchaser and as a vendor.148 That same lawyer 
reported that his company's purchasers try to get the company to sign 
on to an EDI Trading Partner Agreement that includes the pur­
chaser's terms and conditions, and that his company as purchaser tries 
to do the same with its vendors. He conceded that in neither case is 
the vendor generally accepting the terms and conditions beyond those 
governing the electronic transmission of orders.149 
Another electronically based innovation is purchasing not through 
an EDI order but instead over the Internet with a personal password 
that gets you into the vendor's inventory system tO do direct order­
ing.150 Even these particularized "e-business sites" do not typically 
solve the battle of the forms, however, because once again the only 
real change is with the mode of communication. How to compromise 
the nonimmediate terms of the sale remains a separate and thorny is­
sue. 
146. See generally Electronic Messaging Servs. Task Force, supra note 4. 
147. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 9) (on file with author). 
148. See Interview No. 17 (transcript at 2-3, 9-11) (on file with author). 
149. See id. 
150. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 8) (on file with author); Interview No. 14 (tran­
script at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 23 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author). 
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The one trend that is likely to have the greatest effect on the battle 
of the forms is a market trend, namely the consolidation of major re­
tailers into a smaller number of larger entities. A number of the re­
spondents indicated that as major retailers become larger and have 
more leverage, they are using their leverage in the sales-contracting 
process to insist that any vendor who wishes to do business with them 
must first sign on to all of the terms of their purchase orders.151 The 
lawyer for an office products manufacturer described this trend and 
noted that his company is large enough that it can insist on at least ne­
gotiating nonimmediate terms and conditions with the retail purchas­
ers.152 He wondered, however, whether smaller companies will have 
the same ability as his company does in insisting that the big retailers 
sit down and compromise on some of their terms.153 
The last trend mentioned in the interviews was the effect of a 
global market. The in-house lawyer for a consumer appliance manu­
facturer said that her company will not allow a battle-of-the-forms 
situation to develop whenever it is dealing with a non-U.S. vendor. 
The reason, she said, is that her company is much more comfortable 
being under the U.C.C. than it would be under the CISG.154 
CONCLUSION 
Having spent many hours on the phone in interviews that enabled 
me to see only the tip of a very large iceberg, I am left not with radical 
suggestions for change but instead with a few modest observations. 
First, the wheels of commerce seem to have adjusted fairly well to 
whatever complications section 2-207 has introduced into the machin­
ery. On the whole, the individuals I spoke with don't bother to worry 
all that much about the battle-of-the-forms statute, and despite that 
(or perhaps because of it) the statute doesn't seem to end up hurting 
them much in return. 
Second, regarding reform efforts, I finished this project with a 
greater comfort level as to the direction that the Article 2 revision 
project seems to be headed: a modest simplification, more reliance on 
U.C.C. gap-fillers, but ultimately nothing that radical. The sense I got 
of where my interview subjects stood on the revision efforts was: if it 
ain't broke that much, then don't try to fix it that much. As suggested 
earlier, that sentiment may be more an indication of a general aver-
151. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (tran-
script at 9) (on file with author); Interview No. 21 (transcript at 3) (on file with author). 
152 See Interview No. 17 (transcript at 9) (on file with author). 
153. See id. 
154. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 7) (on file with author). 
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sion to change than of a studied conclusion that the current approach 
to section 2-207 is truly optimal. 
Finally, if there was one common thread that ran through all of the 
interviews I conducted, it was a plea not to create laws that get in the 
way of how businesses do their thing. As one business person with 
whom I spoke put it: "American business has gotten to the point 
where the focus on eliminating any sort of bureaucracy is the push . . .  
and I think anything that puts a step in between that [should be 
avoided]."155 
155. Interview No. 11 (transcript at 5) (on file with author). 
